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This study analyses the financial performance of business group affiliated firms relative 
to stand-alone firms in Pakistan. The investigations are done across the sample period of 1993-
2012. The study employs ‘Chop shop’ methodology to construct the excess values 
(performance measure); in order to compare the results with earlier well documented studies of 
both developed and emerging countries. Both univariate and regression analyses clearly 
demonstrate that group affiliated firms are trading at discount (underperform relative to stand-
alone firms) during the sample period. Despite the historical success in the past, the findings 
suggest that business groups evolve differently in the post financial reforms and privatisation 
programs era. The findings are consistent with the market failure argument and agency theory. 
However, the study finds a little evidence of efficient internal markets of Pakistani business 
groups. 
Keywords: Business Groups, Group Affiliation, Excess Value, Market Failure 
Theory, Agency Theory, Chop Shop Methodology  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Research, on the role of business groups is one of the most extensively 
investigated areas in the fields of corporate finance and firm strategy.  [Chang and Hong 
(2000); Khanna and Palepu (2000a); Soo, et al. (2010)]. Business groups play an 
important yet poorly understood role in the economies like South Korea, China, 
Indonesia, Chile, India, and Pakistan [Khanna and Yafeh (2007)]. Business groups are 
defined as the coalition of legally independent firms that are linked to each other by a 
constellation of formal (ownership) and informal (social) ties and are accustomed to 
taking coordinated actions [Granovetter (1994); Khanna and Rivkin  (2001)].  
A number of researchers propose theoretical perspectives to support the argument 
that business group affiliation improves firm performance in emerging economies [Kali 
and Sarkar  (2005); Gadhoum, et al. (2007); Mishra and Akbar (2007)]. A prevalent view 
suggests that affiliation with a business group enhances firm performance in the countries 
with extensive market failures and excessive associated transaction costs [Leff (1978); 
Hovakimian (2011)]. Khanna and Palepu (1997) opine that business groups serve as 
substitute of missing business, supporting institutional environment in the developing 
countries. Khanna and Palepu (2000a) document that advanced countries possess 
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developed and well functioning capital, labor and product markets. In contrast certain 
institutional voids, for instance information and contracting problems, poor law 
enforcement and weak regulatory and corporate governance systems, etc., exist in 
emerging economies like South Korea, China, India and Pakistan. Business groups 
substitute for these missing institutional voids. These are well diversified across various 
industries and facilitate affiliated firms to internalise market transactions and thus create 
internal networks of value enhancing mechanism, by providing access to scarce group 
resources and capabilities. These resources may include information, skills and 
management, markets, brand names and finance [Mahmood, et al. (2011); Lamin and 
Dunlap (2011)].  
The business groups’ headquarters are not only concerned with the profit 
maximisation but also serve for group stability and survival. Estrin, Poukliakova, and 
Shapiro (2009) present that resource sharing within group affiliates minimises transaction 
costs and reduces risk. Khanna and Yafeh (2005) provide evidences for risk sharing role 
of business groups through reallocation of funds from one affiliate with excess cash flows 
to another having shortage of cash flows and further these help in smoothing income 
flows among their affiliates. Resource based view suggests that recurring transactions 
among group firms lead to richer flow of information and thus improve resource 
allocation [Guillen (2000)]. These privileges are unavailable to stand-alone (unaffiliated) 
firms and these may contribute positively to the financial performance of group affiliated 
firms relative to their counterpart stand-alone firms. 
The institutional setting plays a vital role regarding group affiliation-performance 
relationship. As the institutional environment changes, the performance impacts of group 
affiliation strategy are also expected to evolve differently [Chakrabarti, Singh, and 
Mahmood (2007)]. Lee, et al. (2008), Purkayastha (2013) and Khanna and Palepu 
(2000b) find evidences that group firms perform better than stand-alone firms during the 
early periods when institutional environment was underdeveloped in the country and 
however, these group firms tend to show lower performance in the latter periods as 
market institutions got matured.  
In Pakistan, financial reforms and privatisation programs were initiated in early 
1990s and these had dramatically changed the economic landscape for business groups. 
The business groups had to restructure their group affiliation related strategies, owing to 
institutional setting that had facilitated them in corporate control until pre-reforms era. 
Having enjoyed highly privileged licenses and quota systems, big business tycoons, 
having dominated the corporate sector, have to face much needed stiff market 
competition and further those business groups, thrived on rent seeking and other in-
efficiencies in the pre-reforms period, may have suffered in the post reforms era.   
A growing number of studies contend that group affiliation harms firm value. 
Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (1999), La Porta, et al. (1997, 1999) and Waseemullah, et al. 
(2017) among others document that the unique business group structure often forms 
pyramidal ownership structures. Such ownership structures allow an apex firm to achieve 
an ultimate control over many other firms simultaneously, without making commensurate 
cash flows investments. The ultimate controller attempts private benefits consumption at 
the expense of external shareholders; thus posit costs of group affiliation, particularly in 
emerging markets where legal institutions are poorly developed [Faccio, et al. (2001); 
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Joh (2003); Holmén and Högfeldt (2005); Djankov, et al. (2008); Gohar and Karacaer 
(2009)]. This may engender agency conflicts among the shareholders and the centre of 
the corporate governance shifts away from traditional principal-agent (P-A) conflicts to 
principal-principal (P-P) conflicts e.g., conflicts between ultimate controlling 
shareholders and external shareholders [Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000b); Bae, et 
al. (2002); De Holan and Sanz  (2006)]. 
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), Ikram and Naqvi (2005) and Dow and 
McGuire (2009) propose that tunneling is prevalent, although not universal in the 
business groups of the emerging countries and obviously this activity destroys firm value. 
Some other researchers argue business groups as in-efficient organisation depending on 
rent seeking, facing a burden of excessive coordination and bureaucratic costs, 
concentration of incompetent management and inefficient resource allocation among the 
group affiliated firms. 
A number of researchers examine the group affiliation-performance relationship 
by applying a unitary lens. However, a unitary theoretical perspective provides partial 
view of the relationship and thus it is immensely required to investigate the relationship 
by applying multi-theoretic lens of market failure theory in a changed institutional 
perspective and agency theory [Wright, et al. (2005); George and Kabir (2008)].  
In Pakistani context, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the group 
affiliation-performance relationship. Ghani, Haroon and Ashraf (2011) and Ahmad and 
Kazmi (2016) find superior performance (measured by ROA) whereas Gohar and 
Karacaer (2009) observe lower performance of group affiliated firms than stand-alone 
firms. Further, there is an increasing concern regarding the endogeneity problem and 
selection bias in group affiliation-performance relationship [Choe, et al. (2014)]. OLS has 
been used in earlier studies that does not appropriately handle these issues and the present 
study attempts to address them.       
The study is primarily concerned with exploring the comparative financial 
performance of group affiliated firms relative to stand-alone firms in Pakistan. An effort 
is made to explore whether group affiliation creates value/value loss (premium or 
discount) in an emerging economy with changed institutional setting in the country. One 
major concern in performance comparison is matching of the group firms with stand-
alone firms of varying characteristics. In order to resolve that issue, Chop shop 
methodology has been used in the earlier studies conducted in the advanced countries. 
The principal contribution of the study lies in adopting the modified “Chop-shop” 
methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995), proposed for measuring the excess values 
(group affiliation premium/discount). Chop-shop valuation approach is widely used in the 
finance literature to estimate the imputed value of a group firm as it operates as an 
average stand-alone firm in the industry and then finding if group firm outperform or 
underperform than an average standalone firm in the same industry.  
 
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A lot of literature on the surge of group affiliation-performance relationship 
appears but there is still disagreement of the researchers whether group affiliation creates 
or destroys firm value. A number of researchers suggest that group affiliated firms 
outperform stand-alone firms [Hoskisson, et al. (2004); Castaneda (2007); Ghosh (2010); 
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Waqar, Ghani, and Haroon (2011); Shi (2015)] whereas some others argue that opposite 
is true [Laeven and Levine (2007); van Lelyveld and Knod (2009); Schamid and Walter 
(2009); Gohar and Karacaer (2009)] and a few of them observe mixed evidences and 
each scholar can point to empirical support for his position [Khanna and Rivkin (2001)]. 
A few studies reveal that group affiliation-performance relationship is not universal and 
these show mixed evidences. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) explore the effect of group 
affiliation on firm profitability by taking a sample of 14 emerging markets and observe 
that group affiliation enhances firm profitability in 6 countries whereas it is harmful in 3 
countries and even is ineffectual in the remaining 5 countries. Kim (2012) and Hyland 
and Diltz (2002) reveal that group affiliation itself may not be value enhancing or value 
destroying activity and that differences in firm characteristics might influence firm value. 
Khanna and Yafeh (2005) document that business groups serve not only for the 
profits maximisation but also helps in reduction of risk for their affiliates. They find 
evidences of risk sharing role of business groups in many emerging countries for instance 
South Korea, India, Thailand, Taiwan and Brazil. They suggest that risk sharing is 
occurred through shared resources, dividends and intra group transfers through flexible 
loans and receivables.  Gopalan, et al. (2007) document that group affiliation provide 
coinsurance function. Similarly, group affiliated firm get benefits of tax shield [Gramlich, 
et al. (2004). 
Institutional setting plays a key role in explaining group affiliation-performance 
relationship. In developing countries, business supporting institutional environment is 
underdeveloped. The business groups substitute for the external environment and fill the 
gap of missing labor, capital and product markets [Leff (1978); Khanna and Palepu 
(1997)]. Chang and Choi (1988) find superior profitability of diversified group affiliated 
firms relative to stand-alone firms in Korea. They observe 2 percent higher accounting 
profits for firms affiliated with large business groups than unaffiliated firms. Khanna and 
Palepu (2000b) find that firms affiliated with the largest business groups perform better 
than stand-alone firms in India. Large diversified business groups could internalise the 
bureaucratic and coordination costs associated with the management of diverse 
operations of the business group more efficiently and are consequently able to generate 
more value for their affiliated firms. 
Claessens, et al. (2000a) employ a data set of 2,187 firms from 9 East Asian 
countries including high income countries (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) 
and low income countries (Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia). They find significantly 
higher excess values for group firms in low income countries whereas lower excess 
values for higher income countries. The findings confirm market failure argument that 
arrangement of finance is critical for firms in the countries with underdeveloped capital 
markets and business group fills that gap efficiently which results in higher firm 
performance. Similarly, Buysschaert, et al. (2004) find superior financial performance of 
group affiliated firms in Belgium and however, they discover an inverse link of intra-
group financing with firm performance which suggests that business groups face 
problems in allocation of funds among their affiliated firms. 
A number of studies on group affiliation-performance relationship conclude that 
changes in institutional environment matters. The relationship between strategic choices 
and financial outcomes is dynamic and contingent on the institutional environment 
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[Chakrabarti, et al. (2007); Purkayastha (2013)]. A few researchers observe that group 
firms show superior performance during the period of underdeveloped institutional 
environment and conversely these firms underperform than stand-alone firms in the latter 
periods when market infrastructure is remarkably developed. The study of Lee, et al. 
(2008) observes that Korean chaebols reveal a declining trend in performance relative 
stand-alone firms. They find that group firms were trading at premium (higher excess 
values for group firms than stand-alone firms), started from 1980s until through early 
1990s. They observe a declining trend in group premium which finally turned into 
discount in the mid-1990s. Their findings support market failure theory that group firms 
decline in performance with the development of institutional infrastructure in South 
Korea. 
The same trend is shown in the study of Khanna and Palepu (2000a). They find 
higher profitability for group affiliated firms than stand-alone firms in Chile and 
however, there is a gradual decrease in performance with the development of market 
infrastructure in the country. Kumar, et al. (2008) employ a data set for a period of 1990-
2006 and observe that group firms decline in performance, corresponding to stand-alone 
firms in the post financial reforms era in India. They demonstrate that group firms tend to 
decrease in performance with the development of market institutions in the country. 
Moreover, they observe that older group firms perform relatively better in these situations 
of institutional transitions. Pattanayak (2009) confirms lower performance of group 
affiliated firms than stand-alone firms in India. They argue that advantageous effect of 
group affiliation disappears as capital markets get matured. 
Lee, et al. (2002b) attempt answering few questions regarding the emergence and 
performance of business groups in South Korea. They focus how business groups 
emerged and then what happened with them that they declined in performance. They 
propose that business groups emerged in response to market failures. Further, business 
groups facilitate their affiliates entering in the new markets which were formerly 
monopolised by the forerunning businesses. They document few reasons behind the 
decline in the performance of business groups. They suggest that performance of business 
groups decreases over the time with the development of institutional setting in the 
country. Moreover, group firms suffer from in-efficient investment drive that leads to 
agency conflicts among the shareholders. 
Lins and Servaes (2002) observe a significant discount for diversified business 
groups relative to single segment firms in 7 emerging markets. They suggest that ultimate 
controllers in group affiliated firms enjoy excess control rights than cash flow rights and 
that they are motivated in expropriation of firm resources from one firm where they have 
least cash flow rights to other firms where they have higher cash flow rights. Betrand, 
Mehta, and Mullainathan (2000) document tunneling evidence in the Indian business 
groups. Bae, et al. (2002) find that wealth is transferred to dominant shareholders at the 
expense of minority shareholders within Korean chaebols. 
In Pakistani context, the earlier studies show mixed results. Ghani, Haroon and 
Ashraf (2011) take a sample of KSE listed firms for the years 1998 and 2002 and find 
higher financial performance (ROA) of group affiliated firms than stand-alone firms. 
Similarly, Ahmad and Kazmi (2016) document that group firms outperform stand-alone 
firms in Textile Sector of Pakistan. In contrast, Gohar and Karacaer (2009) employ a 
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sample of 166 KSE listed firms for a period of 2002 to 2006 and find that group firms 
underperform than stand-alone firms. The results suggest that group firms fall into 
serious problem of agency conflicts among the shareholders. These contrasting results 
stress the need to investigate the group affiliation-performance relationship on a dynamic 
longitudinal data, by applying relevant methodology of Chop shop in a country facing 
remarkable changed institutional setting. Both of the earlier studies have ignored the 
Chop shop methodology that had been widely used in the studies conducted on group 
affiliation-performance relationship.  
 
2.1.  Hypotheses of the Study 
H 1a: There is a significantly lower financial performance of group affiliates than 
stand-alone firms. 
H 1b: There is a significantly higher financial performance of group affiliates than 
stand-alone firms.     
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
The study sample consists of 367 (including 159 stand-alone firms and 208 group 
affiliated firms belonging to 60 business groups) non-financial firms listed on Karachi 
Stock Exchange covering a period of 1993-2012.  
The study modifies the widely used ‘Chop Shop’ methodology of Berger and Ofek 
(1995) to determine group premium or discount so that study results can be compared 
with the earlier studies, for instance Lang and Stulz (1994), Ferris, et al. (2003) and Lee, 
et al. (2008). The excess value is obtained through two main steps. In the first step, 
imputed value of a group firm is estimated as multiplying the group firm’s earnings 
before interest and taxes with the capital value to earnings before interest and taxes ratio 
for median stand-alone firm operating in the same industry.
1
 In the second step, excess 
value is calculated as the natural log of the ratio of firm’s actual value (defined as market 
value of equity plus book value of liabilities) to its imputed value.
2
 The positive excess 
value suggests that group affiliation enhances the performance of the group affiliates 
whereas negative excess value shows that affiliation with a business group harms firm 
value.  
There are some issues in estimation that are needed to be addressed carefully. One 
of the major issues is that there may be endogeneity problems (omitted variables, 
selection bias and reverse causality). Besides the observable factors like group affiliation, 
there may be some unobservable factors like managerial skills among others that may 
affect the firm performance but may not be included as regressors in the value equation. 
In addition, there may be regressors (group affiliation in this case) that may be correlated 
with the error term.  
Most importantly, group affiliation may be endogenous [Bae, et al. (2011)] 
because there are certain factors like firm profitability, risk, growth prospects and/or 
 
1Following Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lee, et al. (2008) industry median is derived from the sample 
of standalone firms. 
2In order to eliminate the firms with extreme excess values, the study follows Ferris, et al. (2003) and 
Lee, et al. (2008). Those firms with excess values more than four times the firm’s imputed value or one-fourth 
of the imputed value are excluded from the sample.    
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firm size among others that motivate a business group to acquire/select a firm under 
his control; and these factors affecting the propensity of a firm to be a group affiliate 
may also influence firm performance. Hence, selection of a firm to be a group 
affiliate or not may not be random rather it is based on some firm specific factors 
[Choe, et al. (2014)] and further, firm performance may be dynamic in nature 
[Mishra (2014)].    
Therefore, the study employs both system Generalised method of moments 
(GMM) and treatment effects of endogenous self-selection (Heckman selection styled 
model) to investigate the impact of group affiliation on firm performance. In GMM 
models, lag dependent variable and explanatory variables are used as instruments 
following Arellano and Bond (1991); Javid and Iqbal (2008). The treatment effect 
models consider the effect on an endogenously chosen binary treatment , in this case 
the choice to be a group affiliate, on another endogenous continuous variable, in this 
case an indicator of firm performance, conditional on two sets of independent 
variables. The first set of variables is used to estimate a selection equation that 
describes the group affiliation choice. The estimates from the selection equation are 
then used in the value function.  
In lines with Yu, Ees, and Lensik (2009), the study uses Heckman styled self-
selection treatment effect model as follows: 
                         … … … … … (1) 
Where yit is the dependent variable (performance indicator e.g., Excess value-EBIT) for 
firm i at time t, Dit is the binary independent variable (Dit = 1 for group affiliated firm and 
otherwise Dit = 0 for standalone firm i at time t). Xit are the control variables for a firm i at 
time t (e.g., list age, leverage, size, risk, profitability and growth) that affect firm 
performance and εit is the error term.   
The group affiliation decision (selection equation) is given below: 
              … … … … … … … (2) 
Dit = 1 if D*it  > 0 and Dit = 0 otherwise. Zit are the variables that affect the group 
affiliation decision of the firm, µit is the error term. 
By substituting Dit in Equation (2) with Equation (3); firm performance model is as 
follows: 
                                 … … … … (3) 
If  D*it  > 0; Dit = 1  and  
                … … … … … … (4) 
Where D*it  ≤ 0; Dit = 0 
In line with the reasoning of Heckman’s (1979) two step procedure, the study 
employs two-steps procedure to estimate the regression coefficients of Equations (3) and 
(4). In the first step, the probability of group affiliation is found and obtaining the 
estimates of selection correction—called lambda (hazards). In the second step, the 
lambda (hazards) estimates from the first step are included in the regression model of 
firm performance.   
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Fig. 1. Variable Definitions 
Excess Value-EBIT 
It is calculated as natural logarithm of actual value to imputed value ratio (as 
discussed above). The positive value implies that group affiliated firm outperforms than 
standalone firms operating in the same industry (group affiliation premium) and negative 
value indicates that group affiliated firm underperforms than stand-alone firms operating 
in the particular industry (group affiliation discount) [Lee, et al. (2008)]. 
 
Group Affiliation  
Dummy A dummy variable of 1 is given for firms affiliated with a business 
group and 0 if a firm is stand-alone. Group firms are selected on the basis of ultimate 
control of members under the umbrella of a particular group. The ultimate control is 
determined by examining the social ties, management, cross directorate-ships, cross 
shareholdings and pyramidal structures. 
 
List Age 
Natural logarithm of the number of years till 2012 from the date of firm listing on 
the stock exchange [Yu, Ees, and Lensik (2009)].  
 
Leverage  
Leverage is defined as total liabilities/total assets [Yu, Ees, and Lensik (2009)].  
 
Size 
The natural logarithm of market capitalisation is taken as a proxy of firm size. 
 
Risk  
Risk is the standard deviation of return on capital employed.  
 
Profitability 
Firm profitability is measured by earnings before interest and taxes/total sales 
[Lee, et al. (2008)].  
 
Growth 
Growth is calculated as market value of equity/book value of equity [Manos 
(2001)].  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Table 1 demonstrates the information pertained to Pakistani business groups 
included in the sample. The statistics show the number of business groups covered in the 
study sample every year, average number of firms and minimum/maximum number of 
firms belong to each business group every year.  
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Table 1 
Information of Pakistani Business Groups in Each Year 
Year No. of Business Groups Avg No. of Firms 
Median No. of 
Firms 
Min No. of 
Firms 
Max No. of 
Firms 
1993 45 2.7560 2 1 10 
1994 45 2.7780 2 1 10 
1995 45 2.6222 2 1 9 
1996 46 2.7177 2 1 9 
1997 45 2.9333 2 1 10 
1998 46 2.9133 2 1 10 
1999 47 2.8722 2 1 10 
2000 47 2.9155 2 1 10 
2001 56 3.5000 3 1 13 
2002 56 3.5000 3 1 13 
2003 56 3.4820 3 1 13 
2004 56 3.4290 3 1 13 
2005 56 3.3930 3 1 13 
2006 56 3.4111 3 1 13 
2007 56 3.3755 3 1 13 
2008 56 3.3578 3 1 13 
2009 56 3.3578 3 1 13 
2010 56 3.3578 3 1 13 
2011 55 3.3090 3 1 12 
2012 55 3.2180 3 1 12 
Note: Author Source. 
 
Table 2 presents the information related to composition of sample, categorised into 
group firms and stand-alone firms every year. The figures show that sample comprises of 
group (stand-alone) firms of 124 (84) in 1993 which significantly expand to 177 (114) 
during the sample period until 2012. The same trend is expressed in Figure 2.      
 
Table 2 
Number of Group Firms and Standalone Firms in Each Year 
Year Group Firms Standalone Firms 
1993 124 84 
1994 125 89 
1995 118 87 
1996 125 91 
1997 132 97 
1998 134 100 
1999 135 98 
2000 137 98 
2001 196 150 
2002 196 149 
2003 195 147 
2004 193 146 
2005 190 144 
2006 191 146 
2007 189 135 
2008 188 133 
2009 188 132 
2010 188 126 
2011 182 120 
2012 177 114 
  3303 2386 
Note: Author Source. 
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Fig. 2.  Sample Compositions: Group Firms vs. Standalone Firms 
 
 
Panel A in Table 3 presents the univariate analyies. A comparison of Excess value-
EBIT is done across stand-alone firms and group firms. The statistics show that both 
mean and median excess values-EBIT are remarkably lower for group firms than their 
corresponding stand-alone firms and the differences of mean and median values are 
highly significant. The findings clearly show that group discount is present during the 
sample period. The underperformance (discount) of group firms than stand-alone firms in 
the post financial reforms era supports Hypothesis 1a and is consistent with the market 
failure argument and agency theory. 
 
Table 3 Panel A 
Comparative Excess Value-EBIT for Standalone Firms and Group Firms 
Variable Firm Mean Median St. Dev. 
Excess Value-EBIT Standalone 0.0849 0.0662 0.2391 
 
Group 0.0458*** 0.0358*** 0.2521 
 All 0.0613 0.0500 0.2478 
Note: T-tests are used for comparisons of means, and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used for comparisons of 
medians. ***, ** and * denote significance of differences at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B in Table 3 highlights the financial demographics across group firms and 
stand-alone firms. The statistics show that group firms underperform than stand-alone 
firms in terms of market performance measure of Tobin’s Q, consistent with the above 
results and however, these show superior performance in terms of accounting 
performance measure of ROA (return on assets). Group firms are paying higher 
dividends than stand-alone firms and these firms exhibit higher listing exposure. Group 
firms are significantly different in financing policies. The financial leverage is 
significantly lower for group firms than stand-alone firms. In Pakistani market, larger part 
of debts comes from the banks and other financial institutions which required higher level 
of monitoring and transparent financial reporting to safeguard their investment. The 
ultimate group controllers avoid such monitoring. They use complex pyramidal 
ownership structures to achieve and maintain their ultimate control over many firms 
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simultaneously with the least capital invested. Group firms exhibit significantly lower 
level of risk relative to stand-alone firms. These findings are consistent with risk sharing 
and group stability arguments of Khanna and Yafeh (2005) and Estrin, et al. (2009). 
Group firms are larger in terms of both total assets and sales. Group firms show relatively 
higher liquidity (measured by current ratio) consistent with resource sharing argument. 
These can transfer surplus funds from one firm to another firm with shortage of funds.   
 
Table 3 Panel B 
Comparative Financial Characteristics for Standalone and Group Firms 
Variables Firm Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tobin q Standalone 1.3470 0.9710 1.6130 
 
Group 1.1110*** 0.9190*** 0.9160 
 
All 1.2100 0.9380 1.2620 
ROA Standalone –0.0100 0.0030 0.1620 
 
Group 0.0110*** 0.0170*** 0.1280 
 
All 0.0020 0.0100 0.1430 
Dividend Payout Ratio Standalone 0.1150 0.0000 0.3920 
 
Group 0.1750*** 0.0000*** 0.4040 
 
All 0.1500 0.0000 0.4000 
Dividend Yield Standalone 0.0190 0.0000 0.0580 
 
Group 0.0340*** 0.00*** 0.0710 
 
All 0.0280 0.0000 0.0660 
List Age Standalone 27.2120 21.0000 12.8320 
 
Group 30.6280*** 25.0000*** 35.4460 
 
All 29.1950 23.0000 28.3060 
Leverage Standalone 0.9120 0.7200 0.9490 
 
Group 0.7490*** 0.6680*** 0.6040 
 
All 0.8180 0.6890 0.7720 
Growth Standalone 0.15 0.0360 0.6200 
 
Group 0.16 0.0860*** 0.5360 
 
All 0.16 0.0680 0.5720 
Risk Standalone 0.2310 0.0510 0.5540 
 
Group 0.1670*** 0.0570 0.4240 
 
All 0.1940 0.0540 0.4840 
Total Assets Standalone 1136.0000 392.0000 2732.0000 
 
Group 3105.0000*** 910.0000*** 7989.0000 
 
All 2279.0000 656.0000 6413.0000 
Sales Standalone 971.0000 385.0000 1936.0000 
 
Group 2682.0000*** 1020.0000*** 6661.0000 
 
All 1965.0000 684.0000 5295.0000 
Group Diversification Standalone 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
 
Group 8.5620*** 7.0000*** 6.0660 
 
All 5.3900 3.0000 5.9400 
Current Ratio Standalone 1.1850 0.8740 1.4830 
 
Group 1.3680*** 0.9990*** 1.6760 
 
All 1.2910 0.9480 1.6000 
Fixed Assets Ratio Standalone 0.5730 0.5960 0.2390 
 
Group 0.5340*** 0.5390*** 0.2200 
 All 0.5510 0.5580 0.2290 
Note: T-tests are used for comparisons of means, and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used for comparisons of 
medians. ***, ** and * denote significance of differences at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 presents the correlation metrics among the variables. The Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) procedure confirms that there is no strong correlation among the 
explanatory variables indicating that there exists no serious problem of multicollinearity.
3
  
 
Table 4 
Correlations 
Variable 
Excess Value-
EBIT 
Group Affiliation 
Dummy 
List Age Leverage Size Risk 
Profita-
bility 
Growt
h 
Excess Value-
EBIT 
1 
    
   
 
– 
    
   
Group Affiliation 
Dummy 
–0.0771 1 
   
   
 
0.0000 – 
   
   
List Age –0.0056 0.1251 1 
  
   
 
0.7432 0.0000 – 
  
   
Leverage 0.2354 –0.0574 0.0217 1 
 
   
 
0.0000 0.0007 0.2014 –  
 
   
Size –0.1348 0.2558 0.1820 –0.2255 1    
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –    
Risk –0.0205 –0.0599 0.0335 0.1945 –0.1766 1   
 
0.2281 0.0004 0.0485 0.0000 0.0000 –    
Profitability –0.4852 0.0700 0.0451 –0.0968 0.1475 0.0825 1  
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –   
Growth 0.0708 0.0410 –0.0392 –0.1049 0.2568 –0.0718 0.0892 1 
 
0.0000 0.0158 0.0212 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 – 
Note: All coefficients greater than 0.05 values are significant at 1 percent significance level. P-values are in 
italics. 
 
Table 5 reports the pooled OLS and GMM regression results. Group affiliation 
dummy is –0.0155 (p<0.10) and –0.0158(p<0.05) which suggest that group firms tend to 
show lower Excess value-EBIT (group discount) than their corresponding stand-alone 
firms in Pakistan during the 1993-2012 period. The findings suggest that group firms 
underperform than stand-alone firms during the post financial reforms period despite a 
historical success in 1950s and 1960s. Consistent with univariate results, the empirical 
results support Hypothesis 1a.  
The presence of group discount is consistent with market failure theory that group 
firms decline in performance because their advantageous effect disappears with the 
development of institutional setting in the country during the post financial reforms and 
liberalisation period. The regression results support Hypothesis 1a, consistent with the 
studies of Khanna and Palepu (2000a) for Chile; Lee, et al. (2008) for South Korea; 
Pattanayak (2002) for India and Purkayastha (2013) for India and Japan. Further, the 
findings lend support to the agency theory that business groups form pyramid structures 
and the ultimate controllers in these group firms are engaged in tunneling. They plunder 
firm resources away from the minority shareholders for their personal benefits. The 
findings strongly support to the earlier studies of Bertrand, et al. (2002); Bae, et al. 
(2002); Lee, et al. (2002b) and Lins and Servaes (2002). 
Leverage is significantly positively related to firm value, consistent with tax shield 
argument and pecking order theory. However, firm size is negatively related to firm 
value. The impact of risk is negative as per expectations. However, firm profitability is 
 
3VIF procedure is adopted and however, the results are not reported for brevity. 
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negatively associated with firm value. The negative relationship confirms the presence of 
earning management practices adopted by firms in Pakistan and further it indicates the 
lack of confidence of the investors at the reported earnings. The findings are consistent 
with the earlier studies’ results for instance Lee, et al. (2008). Moreover, firm growth 
positively affects firm value.   
 
Table 5 
Pooled OLS and GMM Results of Group Affiliation and Excess Value-EBIT 
  Pooled OLS GMM 
Variable Model Model 
Excess Value-EBITt-1 0.3316*** 0.3208*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Group Affiliation Dummy –0.0155* –0.0158** 
 
0.0786 0.0457 
List Age 0.0020 0.0025 
 
0.7363 0.7146 
Leverage 0.1418*** 0.1479*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Size –0.0067** –0.0061* 
 
0.0190 0.0576 
Risk –0.0235* –0.0299* 
 
0.0798 0.0698 
Profitability –0.1408*** –0.1153** 
 
0.0000 0.0334 
Growth 0.0221*** 0.0237*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Intercept –0.0276 –0.0427* 
 
0.2084 0.0752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2216 0.2203 
F-statistic 93.7112*** 
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
 Hansen J-statistic   9.7420 
Prob(J-statistic) 
 
0.1359 
Note: ***, ** and * denote to coefficients significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. P-values are in italics. 
 
Table 6 reports the regression results of treatment affects models. At first step, a 
binary dependent variable of group affiliation dummy is regressed on firm characteristics 
to determine the firms’ propensity to be a group affiliate. At the second step, the obtained 
estimates are used in the value regression. The results show that group affiliation dummy 
variable is strongly negative and significant even after controlling the endogenous self-
selection, indicating that group affiliation harms firm value.   
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Table 6 
Treatment Effects’ Results of Group Affiliation and Excess Value-EBIT 
Variable Model 1 
Group Affiliation Dummy  –0.3158*** 
 
0.0000 
List age 0.0014*** 
 
0.0000 
Leverage 0.1417*** 
 
0.0000 
Size 0.0043 
 
0.2540 
Risk –0.0643*** 
 
0.0000 
Profitability –0.1100*** 
 
0.0000 
Growth 0.0191*** 
 
0.0000 
Intercept 0.1018*** 
  0.0000 
Group Affiliation Dummy as Dependent Variable: 
List Age 0.0090*** 
 
0.0000 
Leverage 0.0050 
 
0.9300 
Size 0.1851*** 
 
0.0000 
Risk –0.0783 
 
0.1820 
Profitability 0.2495** 
 
0.0170 
Growth –0.0166 
 
0.2800 
Intercept –0.8539*** 
 
0.0000 
Athrho 0.7936*** 
 
0.0000 
Lnsigma –1.3006*** 
  0.0000 
Wald Chi-squared 371.6900*** 
 
0.0000 
Rho 0.6604 
Sigma 0.2724 
Lambda 0.1799 
Wald test of Rho=0 13.8100*** 
  0.0002 
Note: ***, ** and * denote to coefficients significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. P-values are in italics. 
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Table 7 reports the regression results of interaction analysis to highlight the role of 
internal markets of business groups in affecting their affiliated firms’ performance, 
relative to stand-alone firms in Pakistan. The impact of firm characteristics like firm 
listing exposure, leverage, size, growth and profitability may affect firm excess value 
differently for group firms than stand-alone firms, depending upon the strength of 
business groups in providing the internal markets. Group affiliated firms may get benefits 
from the value enhancing internal networks of resource sharing. These firms may share 
resources like information, skills, finance, markets and these may even help each other in 
getting loans [Guillen (2000); Khanna and Palepu (2000a)].  
 
Table 7 
GMM Results of Interaction Analyses 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Excess Value-EBITt-1 0.5804*** 0.3329*** 0.3188*** 0.3197*** 0.6161*** 0.5645*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Group Affiliation Dummy -0.1105*** -0.1056*** -0.0475** -0.0229*** 0.0044 -0.0302*** 
 
0.0050 0.0000 0.0165 0.0000 0.6448 0.0005 
List Age -0.0051 0.0006 0.0030 0.0008 0.0041 0.0085 
 
0.5304 0.9255 0.6527 0.8976 0.6718 0.3761 
Leverage 0.1197*** 0.0851*** 0.1507*** 0.1523*** 0.1194*** 0.1256*** 
 
0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Size 0.0092*** -0.0015 -0.0106*** -0.0062** 0.0137*** 0.0099*** 
 
0.0031 0.6020 0.0090 0.0470 0.0000 0.0006 
Risk 0.0015 -0.0212 -0.0314** -0.0546* 0.0059 -0.0077 
 
0.9524 0.1474 0.0442 0.0542 0.8465 0.7750 
Profitability -0.3440*** -0.1370** -0.1173** -0.1150** -0.1214* -0.3710*** 
 
0.0000 0.0124 0.0287 0.0395 0.1048 0.0000 
Growth 0.0132** 0.0189*** 0.0240*** 0.0222*** 0.0135** 0.0106* 
 
0.0329 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0140 0.0656 
Group Affiliation Dummy*List Age 0.0299** 
     
 
0.0180 
     
Group Affiliation Dummy*Leverage 0.1404*** 
    
  
0.0002 
    
Group Affiliation Dummy*Size 
 
0.0062** 
   
   
0.0578 
   
Group Affiliation Dummy*Risk 
  
0.0402 
  
    
0.3066 
  
Group Affiliation Dummy*Profitability 
   
-0.5576*** 
 
     
0.0000 
 
Group Affiliation Dummy*Growth 
    
0.0046 
      
0.5795 
Intercept -0.0759** -0.0118 -0.0241 -0.0360 -0.1360*** -0.1130*** 
 
0.0346 0.6865 0.3802 0.1336 0.0007 0.0017 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1849 0.2262 0.2204 0.2199 0.1789 0.1917 
Hansen J-statistic 7.1442 9.5461 9.7998 10.2821 7.5728 7.0537 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.4140 0.2158 0.2002 0.1731 0.3718 0.4233 
Note: ***, ** and * denote to coefficients significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. P-values are in italics. 
 
The sign of interaction between group affiliation and list age is positive and 
significant whereas it is insignificantly negative for list age variable. It shows that firm 
listing exposure positively affects group firms’ value and however, it seems ineffectual 
for stand-alone firms. Similarly, both leverage and interaction between group affiliation 
dummy and leverage are significantly positive. This suggests that impact of leverage is 
positive for both stand-alone and group firms (consistent with pecking order theory) but 
the  strength of  relationship is  stronger for group firms.  Business groups may transfer  
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Table 7 
Treatment Effects’ Results of Interaction Analyses 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Group Affiliation Dummy  -0.3556*** -0.3302*** -0.3293*** -0.3139*** -0.2276*** -0.3230*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
List Age -0.0003 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 
 
0.5110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 
Leverage 0.1420*** 0.1248*** 0.1416*** 0.1423*** 0.1467*** 0.1406*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Size 0.0026 0.0041 0.0026 0.0042 0.0004 0.0042 
 
0.5130 0.2810 0.6040 0.2710 0.9260 0.2690 
Risk -0.0617*** -0.0631*** -0.0643*** -0.0791*** -0.0632*** -0.0655*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Profitability -0.1100*** -0.1123*** -0.1101*** -0.1103*** -0.0570*** -0.1098*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 
Growth 0.0200*** 0.0187*** 0.0192*** 0.0188*** 0.0193*** 0.0153*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
Group Affiliation Dummy*List Age 0.0029*** 
     
 
0.0000 
     
Group Affiliation Dummy*Leverage 0.0344* 
    
  
0.0950 
    
Group Affiliation Dummy*Size 
 
0.0026 
   
   
0.5990 
   
Group Affiliation Dummy*Risk 
  
0.0330 
  
    
0.1180 
  
Group Affiliation Dummy*Profitability 
  
-0.1910*** 
 
     
0.0000 
 
Group Affiliation Dummy*Growth 
    
0.0068 
      
0.2130 
Intercept 0.1308*** 0.1100*** 0.1100*** 0.1011*** 0.0737*** 0.1066*** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 
Group Affiliation Dummy as Dependent Variable 
    
List Age 0.0083*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Leverage 0.0048 0.0093 0.0041 0.0053 0.0032 0.0046 
 
0.9330 0.8700 0.9420 0.9270 0.9560 0.9360 
Size 0.1860*** 0.1857*** 0.1844*** 0.1856*** 0.1932*** 0.1847*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Risk -0.0748 -0.0780 -0.0784 -0.0788 -0.0703 -0.0780 
 
0.2010 0.1830 0.1820 0.1720 0.2310 0.1840 
Profitability 0.2359** 0.2461** 0.2502** 0.2415** 0.0363 0.2494** 
 
0.0270** 0.0200 0.0160 0.0220 0.6870 0.0170 
Growth -0.0167 -0.0164 -0.0166 -0.0164 -0.0169 -0.0174 
 
0.2770 0.2840 0.2790 0.2860 0.2740 0.2540 
Intercept -0.8480*** -0.8593*** -0.8505*** -0.8563*** -0.8850*** -0.8514*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Athrho 0.7458*** 0.7668*** 0.7942*** 0.7737*** 0.5663*** 0.7972*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lnsigma -1.3186*** -1.3092*** -1.3005*** -1.3070*** -1.3710*** -1.2997*** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald Chi-squared 387.3800*** 372.2500*** 370.8500*** 373.6800*** 396.3500*** 372.9500*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rho 0.6326 0.6451 0.6608 0.6491 0.5126 0.6625 
Sigma 0.2675 0.2700 0.2724 0.2706 0.2539 0.2726 
Lambda 0.1692 0.1742 0.1800 0.1757 0.1301 0.1806 
Wald test of Rho=0 7.3600 11.8500 12.6000 12.7800 5.1300 13.6200 
  0.0067 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0236 0.0002 
Note: ***, ** and * denote to coefficients significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. P-values are in italics. 
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surplus funds from one firm to another firm having shortage of funds and thus timely 
availability of funds may help in availing the opportunities and reduction in cost of funds, 
risk and uncertainty [Estrin, et al. (2009); Khanna and Yafeh (2005)]. The use of external 
funds contributes positively to the excess value if the internal capital markets are efficient 
[Peyer (2002)]. Similarly, interaction between group affiliation and size variable is 
significantly positive indicating that firm size is significantly positively related to firm 
value. The findings provide evidence that group firms are efficient networks of internal 
markets that help each other by providing inputs, assets and other valuable resources.  
More interestingly, both profitability and interaction between group affiliation and 
profitability variables are significantly negative which propose that firm profitability is 
negatively associated with firm value. These results are consistent because earnings 
management practices are well pronounced in the firms of the countries with weak 
corporate governance and regulatory system. Moreover, the ultimate group controllers are 
more entrenched that further augment the potential of earning management practices 
which may ultimately hamper group firms’ value [Shah (2009)].   
Table 7 reports the interactive regression results of Treatment effect models. These 
results are highly consistent with the above GMM results. 
 
5.  SUMMANY AND CONCLUSION 
Like many other emerging economies, business groups are ubiquitous in business 
environment of Pakistan. Business groups are endogenous response to weak legal system, 
underdeveloped financial system and missing other market institutions which support 
business environment. Financial reforms and other privatisation and liberalisation 
programs initiated in early 1990s strengthen the financial sector. This study sheds light on 
the group affiliation-performance relationship in a changed institutional environment 
which is expected to evolve differently. The study extends and supports the institution-
based theory of group affiliation and agency theory by adding a dynamic, longitudinal 
and temporal component.  
The results confirm that group firms are trading at discount and affiliation to a 
diversified business group harms firm value in Pakistan. The results support the market failure 
argument that business groups decline in performance because the institutional environment 
got gradually developed in the post financial reforms and liberalisation era in Pakistan. The 
group affiliation benefits, owing to market failures, disappear and these business groups face 
stiff competition from the external markets and have to frame policies according to the 
changing institutional environment for their survival. The results are highly consistent with the 
market failure theory. The study also finds an empirical evidence of severe agency conflicts 
among the ultimate controlling shareholders and external shareholders. The ultimate 
controllers in these business groups engage in tunneling firm resources for their personal 
consumption that detriment to the external shareholders’ wealth. 
However, the study finds a little evidence in favor of business groups’ internal 
markets argument. The internal networks permit the affiliated firms sharing valuable 
resources, like information, inputs and capital which may be a source of value creation. 
The study finds both positive and negative traits of business group affiliation and 
however, negative attributes outweigh the positive and net effect of group affiliation is 
clear. Group affiliation is seen as a value destroying economic organisation.  
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The study is very important in Pakistani context as it provides guidance to 
managers, practitioners and investors and further it contributes to the existing finance 
literature. The business groups have to restructure and modernise their activities related 
to group affiliation, instead of depending upon rent seeking or other inefficiencies in 
order to compete in the changed institutional setting of capital, labor and product 
markets. Further, it also sheds lights on an important corporate governance issue that 
business groups are engaged in tunneling firm resources that detriment the firm value and 
cause severe agency conflicts among the controlling shareholders and external 
shareholders. 
This study excludes the financial service firms and further it is a firm level study. 
In future it is important to examine the performance relationships within business groups. 
Other sources of costs and benefits to group affiliation, like financial constraints, 
internationalisation strategy, among others are required to be explored in future. 
Moreover, agency conflicts among the ultimate group controllers and minority 
shareholders should be explored further in future studies.  
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